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Marshall: Cuban State Violence and Diaspora

STATE VIOLENCE AND THE CUBAN DIASPORA SINCE 1959
SONDRA K. MARSHALL
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY; UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA AT KEARNEY

MENTOR: DR. ROGER DAVIS

ABSTRACT:
Between 1960 and 1976 the United States alone admitted an estimated 750,000 Cuban
refugees.1 By 2017 the number had risen to an estimated 1,314,100.2 These numbers do not include
the roughly estimated 300,000 Cubans who fled to Mexico, Panama, Puerto Rico, Venezuela,
Canada, Spain, Peru, Germany, Italy, and France.3 Nor do they include the unknown number of
Cubans who drowned attempting to cross the Florida Straits in rafts or were killed or arrested by
Cuban military patrols during attempts to illegally exit Cuba. 4

Repression based on communist ideologies and the calculated use of violence to enforce
them infiltrates all structural aspects of daily life in Cuba. It creates an overarching theme
providing commonality between Cuban politics, sociology, economics, and culture as each applies
to migration pushes. Published interviews with Cuban refugees, United States government
documents, Cuban refugee memoirs, transcripts of intercepted Cuban radio transmissions, United
States press articles, video documentaries focusing on Cuban refugees in the United States, and
other primary and secondary sources all provide trace evidence that fear of violent reprisal from
the Cuban State serves as a primary push in the decisions of individual Cubans to seek both legal
and illegal means of exiting Cuba.
The Orwellian atmosphere created by the Castro Regime’s methods of enforcing political,
economic, and cultural ideologies is a rarely examined facet of the Cuban diaspora. Most studies
of the Cuban diaspora focus on the long failing Cuban economy, the tightly controlled expressions
of Cuban culture, and the development of Eastern European based communist politics and
ideologies as pushes that have driven the cyclical tides of the Cuban diaspora since 1959. A
minority of existing sociological, psychological, political, and cultural research touches briefly on
the Castro Regime’s calculated use of legitimized state violence to enforce ideologies, policies,
and laws. This paper will link Cuban State violence and human rights violations through the
1
Silvia Pedraza-Bailey, “Cuba’s Exiles: Portrait of a Refugee Migration,” The International Migration
Review 19, no. 1 (1985), 4.
2
Jorge Duany. “Cuban Migration: A Postrevolutionary Exodus Ebbs and Flows,” Migration Policy
Institute (2017), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/cuban-migration-postrevolution-exodus-ebbs-and-flows.
3
Ibid.
4
“Database,” Archivo Cuba, accessed November 14, 2021, https://cubaarchive.org/ database/.
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nation’s economic, social, cultural, and political structures to exhibit how pervasive, government
cultivated, fear and anxiety create a keystone push that still drives the Cuban diaspora in 2022.
Historiography
As Holly Ackerman observes “[u]nlike Eastern Europe where communism was imposed
by a conqueror, the Cuban people welcomed the revolution, and it came from within.” 5 Castro’s
conversion to communism and budding alliance with the Soviet Union had blindsided the Cuban
people. Besides Castro’s early subterfuge, Cuba is also uniquely situated geographically in the
western hemisphere, providing a unique geographical environment in which to study the
relationship between the use of state violence and diaspora. However, this is by no means a
comprehensive study. It hamstringed by lack of access to Cuban government records and archives.
As such, this study relies heavily on Cold War era journalism, United States Cold War era records
and policies, the Organization of American States and Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, and publications and records compiled and maintained by the Cuban American refugee
community. It represents a view skewed towards American and Cuban American perspectives
concerning state violence in Cuba.
The historiography of the Cuban diaspora has been examined from a dauting number of
perspectives, including the application of numerous sociological theories, analyses of the cyclical
economic crises, examination of the protean political and cultural policies of Castro, diplomatic
and political discussions of Cuba’s ties to the Soviet Union, the effects of hemispheric trade
embargos, and examinations of the mercurial immigration policies of the United States. It is an
interdisciplinary topic that attracts historians, sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, policy
and law makers, economists, film makers, and political scientists. The existing literature
collectively reveals that Cubans leave their homeland for a wide variety of reasons all dependent
upon individual experience. Sociologist Silvia Pedraza-Bailey summed this up best when she
quoted sociologist Peter I Rose: “Refugees do not live in a vacuum. They are part of an intricate
sociopolitical web that must be seen as the background against which any portrait of their travails
must be painted and any dissection of their innermost thoughts and feelings must be pinned.” 6
Pedraza-Bailey’s article “Cuba Exiles: Portrait of a Refugee Migration” examines the
waves of the Cuban diaspora through the publication of the article in 1985. Her work examines
the changes in social and demographic characteristics of Cuban refugees by examining the ongoing
changes within the Cuban revolution. These social and demographic changes help identify the
individuals and groups targeted as adversaries or enemies of the Cuban state as it evolved under
the Castros. Her work is built around, and reacts to, theoretical framework concerning refugee
migration published by Egon F. Kunz in 1973 and 1981.7 The present study concerning state
violence and the Cuban diaspora utilizes Pedraza-Bailey’s work to identify the demographic

Holly Ackerman, “Mass Migration, Nonviolent Social Action, and the Cuban Raft Exodus, 1959-1994:
An Analysis of Citizen Motivation and International Politics,” Dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
August 1996, 193.
6
Pedraza-Bailey, “Cuba’s Exiles: Portrait of a Refugee Migration,” 4.
7
Ibid, 4.
5
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groups most at risk of being identified as enemies of the Cuban state and most likely to seek out
creative and dangerous means of leaving their homeland.
Available studies concerning the effects of state violence are generally limited to studies
of violence to study its effects on the occurrence of psychological aspects, such as the occurrence
of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), among refugees. For instance, M. Brinton Lykes and
Rachel M. Hershberg in their study of psychosocial effects in Guatemalan migration, theorize that
“multiple iterations of violence. . .can best be understood through an analysis of the complex
interface of racism, gender violence, entrenched poverty, and forced migration; structural forces
which participants themselves identify.” 8 Lykes’ and Hershberg’s examination of how
“marginalized groups, narrate their individual life stories to a greater or lesser degree within
collective struggles of resistance to historical and contemporary oppression” in Guatemala
provides a psychosocial foundation for examining how state violence effects the stories of Cuban
refugees, exiles, and migrants. 9 Their methodology was designed to focus on the issue of
migration, however, they discovered that “all participants connected their migration to longer
histories of violence.”10 Some subject narratives contained ‘graphic’ descriptions of experience
with violence associated with armed conflict and others focused on its “material and psychosocial
consequences.”11
In her dissertation Holly Ackerman specifically examines the motivations of 63,000 Cuban
Americans who traversed the treacherous ninety miles of the Florida Straits in flimsy, make-shift
rafts between 1959 and 1994. Ackerman concluded that there were four reasons Cubans became
balsero (rafter) migrants. First, is what she calls ‘la doble cara o mascara’ or “the necessity of
wearing ‘a mask’ of political compliance in Cuba. This category encompasses “the duality of
behavioral manifestation of unswerving support and loyalty to the regime that all citizens must
show in order to avoid sanctions, and the underlying beliefs and reactions of the individual that lie
beneath the supportive mask.”12 The second category which she labels “the uncertainty of quien
es quien,’ or ‘who is who’, covers motivations based on “the discomfort caused by the ubiquitous
presence of ideological vigilance, scapegoating, state informants and state security at every level
of society.”13 The third motivation she identifies is the necessity of engaging in black market trade
“theft, illegal and immoral conduct.”14 The fourth commonly stated motivation was the “potential
for violent retribution if the present system of social control erodes rapidly.” 15 It is interesting to
note, despite long standing economic trouble in Cuba, only 4.7% of Ackerman’s subjects identified
purely economic motives for illegally exiting Cuba, while 56.6% identified political motivations
M. Brinton Lykes and Rachel M. Hershberg, “Continuities and Discontinuities in Human Rights
Violations: Historically Situating the Psychosocial Effects of Migration,” Journal of Social Issues, 7, No.2
(2015), 248.
9
Ibid, 248.
10
Ibid, 248.
11
Ibid, 248.
12
Ackerman, “Mass Migration, Nonviolent Social Action, and the Cuban Raft Exodus, 19591994, 153.
13
Ibid, 153.
14
Ibid, 153.
15
Ibid, 153.
8
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such as “opposition to the regime, desire for freedom from communism and the pervasiveness of
state control,” and 32.9% expressed a mixture of political, social, economic, and personal
motivations.16
Works such as Richard C. Allison’s "Cuba's Seizures of American Business," K. M.
Greenhill’s Weapons of mass migration: Forced displacement, coercion, and foreign policy,
Haroldo Dilla and Philip Oxhorn’s “The Virtues and Misfortunes of Civil Society in Cuba,” Ana
Belén Martín Sevillano’s “From Domestic to Statist Violence,” and countless other authors
provide in depth examinations of the various shifts and crises in economic, political, social, and
cultural aspects of the years following the Cuban Revolution. A handful of authors, such as
political scientist Yvon Grenier, add to the study of the use and effects of state violence though
various political and cultural lenses. Grenier, for example, proposes that cyclic ‘closing’ and
‘opening’ of Castro’s cultural policies represent “part of the governing strategy of the regime.” 17
Grenier is among the minority of researchers who have touched on the link between the
motivations behind shifts in Fidel Castro’s policies and the violent and inhumane methods applied
to enforce them. Grenier’s “The Politics of Culture and the Gatekeeper State in Cuba” focuses on
Cuban cultural policies and how they affect artists and intellectuals who function within the
restraints of the mercurial policies of Fidel Castro and those who insist on pushing past the edge
of what is, at any given time, considered acceptable public criticism or representation of the
revolutionary government.
Together, these studies provide the framework upon on which to build an examination of
how fear of state violence operates to drive the Cuban diaspora and provide an explanation for the
hundreds of thousands of Cuban citizens who have risked or given up their lives in efforts to escape
what Juana Castro once called “the inferno of today’s Cuba.”18
Blood Begets Blood
Historically, like most Latin American nations, the Cuban people are no stranger to
poverty, violence, political instability, and other daily hardships. To understand the policies of
Fidel Castro since 1959, it is important to review the seven years leading up to his rise to power.
Prior to the rise of Fidel Castro, Cuba was not a poor, underdeveloped, or uneducated
nation. The island nation had enjoyed a democratic form of government since the Constitution of
1940. Cuban migration was low. 19 This island nation boasted an above average percentage of
literacy and an above average health care system compared to other Latin American countries. 20
16

Ibid, 150.
Yvon Grenier, “The Politics of Culture and the Gatekeeper State in Cuba,” Cuban Studies 46
(2018), 261.
18
Associated Press, “Fidel Betrayed Cuba, Fleeing Sister Says,” The News Journal (DE), June 30,
1964, 2.
19
Jorge Duany, “Cuban Migration: A Postrevolutionary Exodus Ebbs and Flows,” Migration
Policy Institute (2017), accessed November 12, 2021, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/ article/cubanmigration-postrevolution-exodus-ebbs-and-flows.
20
Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza, Carlos Alberto Montaner and Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Guide to the
Perfect Latin American Idiot, Lanham, MD: Madison Books (2001), 97.
17
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Economically the island ranked on a par with nations like Italy. 21 However, on March 10, 1952, a
military coup led by General Fulgencio Batista put an end to the democratic government. In 1952,
Fidel Castro, a lawyer and member of the reformist Cuban People’s Party, was nominated as a
Havana district candidate to potentially serve in the House of Representatives. After the coup, on
July 26, 1953, Fidel led a small group of rebels in an unsuccessful attempt to oust Batista. The
Batista regime imprisoned both Fidel and his brother Raul. Then the regime granted the brothers
amnesty in 1955. The brothers went to Mexico where they organized other Cuban exiles hoping
to make a second attempt to oust Batista. Fidel and Raul Castro, accompanied by Ernesto “Che”
Guevara, returned to Cuba December 2, 1956. Armed conflict between the Castros’ guerrilla
revolutionaries and the Batista Regime quickly developed into the equivalent of a Cuban Civil
War. The violence became so pronounced that by 1958 the United States had imposed an arms
embargo against Cuba.22
In May 1958, Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, President of the Havana Bar Association, and later
President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, publicly alleged that the Batista government was
‘systematically’ killing off the Cuban intellectual community. 23 Cardona estimated 3,000 people
had been killed and that “[the] human reserves of Cuba [were] being exhausted.” 24 Cardona
charged that the Batista government was killing off the “best element” of Cuba and predicted that
the longer the situation was allowed to stand the “fewer genuine leaders” would be left. 25 Cardona
took refuge in the Mexican Embassy after secret police raided the Bar Association offices. He fled
Cuba, taking up residence in Miami, Florida. 26 Cardona became a leader in the Cuban exile
community and worked towards seeking international acknowledgement of and redress for human
rights violations allegedly being committed by the Castro regime. Cardona was one of many
Cubans who were either forced or chose to flee Cuba during the bloody conflict between Castro
and Batista. What had been a drip in the overall flow of Cuban migration since the early nineteenth
century, was now a slow flowing stream under Batista. Those who died at the hands of the Batista
government has been estimated to be around 20,000. 27
Reports of massacres, kidnappings, bombing, destruction of highways, burning of crops,
and retaliations for killings by both sides of the conflict frequently reached the American press.
For example, in November 1958 a United Press International (UPI) news article circulated stating
“[r]ebel tommy gunners killed four and wounded eight policemen. . . in a gang-style massacre
apparently inspired by the police slaying of four insurgents ten days ago.” 28 Another 1958 news
21

Mendoza, Montaner and Llosa. Guide to the Perfect Latin American Idiot, 97.
“Cuban Revolution,” Britannica, accessed November 13, 2021, https://www.britannica.
com/event/Cuban-Revolution; and “Fidel Castro,” Britannica, accessed January 21, 2022,
https://www.britannica.com/Biography/Fidel-Castro#ref157337.
23
“Attorney Charges Massacre in Cuba,” Linton Daily Citizen (IN), May 7, 1958.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Berrellez, Robert, “Shocking Story Lies Behind Cuba Atrocities, Executions,” The Sacramento
Bee (CA), February 23, 1959; and Duany. “Cuban Migration: A Postrevolutionary Exodus Ebbs and
Flows.”
28
“Massacre in Cuba is Reported Today,” Linton Daily Citizen (IN), November 18, 1958.
22
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item, penned by Cincinnati Enquirer reporter George Amick, related an interview with Robert
Kirsner, a Spanish professor who had recently returned to the United States from Cuba. Kirsner
described the atmosphere in Cuba as “a place where machine guns bristle along the streets; where
you steer clear of innocent looking packages because they might contain bombs, and where you’re
never sure that the streetcleaner or clerk isn’t a secret policeman who could shoot you dead with
impunity.”29
Elections held in Cuba in November 1958 initially gave hope of some relief to the bloody
situation. However, when the election results were announced, it was obvious to the Cuban
citizenry that the Batista government had rigged the elections. Support for Batista quickly began
to evaporate. The United States arms embargo had crippled Batista’s ability to effectively arm his
soldiers and his forces were unable to stop the advance of Castro’s revolutionaries. After ringing
in the New Year on January 1, 1959, Fulgencio Batista fled to an uncertain reception in the
Dominican Republic. In August 1959 he left the Dominican Republic for the Portuguese island of
Madeira.30
Legitimizing State Violence and the First Wave
“Many times revolutionary violence makes history. But that history is of cruelty and failure, not
of humanity and success.”
~ Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza, Carlos Alberto Montaner and Alvaro Vargas Llosa31
An estimated 3,000 “political leaders, high government officials, military officers, and
businessmen who had important political connections” quickly fled in Fulgencio Batista’s wake. 32
Immediately following the exodus of the upper echelons of Batista’s government, Fidel Castro and
his revolutionaries set about rounding up the remaining Batista supporters and anyone else who
remained that they deemed to be an enemy of the revolution.
On January 12, 1959, under orders given by Raul Castro, seventy-three policemen and
former members of Batista’s armed forces were executed, reportedly without anything resembling
a legitimate trial or due process. The prisoners were taken to a shooting range at San Juan,
positioned in front of a freshly dug ditch, and executed in pairs by a firing squad. A narrative
prepared by the Free Society Project states that at least one man was believed to have been buried
alive when the mass grave was covered. 33 An additional fourteen to sixteen more former members
of Batista’s armed forces were executed in January 1959, again with nothing resembling a
legitimate trial.34 To add insult to injury, Hurricane Flora, which caused catastrophic damage to
Cuba in 1963, washed out the shallow mass grave at San Juan. Instead of simply reburying the

George Amick, “Havana Under Terror, UC Professor Finds,” The Cincinnati Enquirer (OH).
“Cuban Revolution,” Britannica.
31
Mendoza, Plinio Apuleyo, Carlos Alberto Montaner and Alvaro Vargas Llosa. Guide to the
Perfect Latin American Idiot, 90.
32
John F. Thomas,” Cuban Refugee Program,” Welfare in Review. 1, no. 3, (1963), 3.
33
“Database,” Archivo Cuba.
34
Ibid.
29
30
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dead, it has been alleged that the Castro regime had the remains encased in cement and thrown
into Bartlett Deep off the coast of the Oriente province.35
Castro’s rise to power, instead of creating confidence and hope by focusing on making life
better for the Cuban people, became a blood-soaked quest for revenge against the ousted Batista
government and the United States. Ana Belén Martín Sevillano captures the motivation behind the
Castro Regime’s initial use of violence in her article “From Domestic to Statist Violence.”
Sevillano states that the “Marxist political thought that fueled the Cuban revolution conceived
revolutionary violence as a necessary, ethical method to liberate the nation from the neocolonial
capitalist system embodied by the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista.” 36 She places Castro’s use of
violence at the opposite end of the moral spectrum from the flavor of violence utilized by the
Batista government. Sevillano goes on to state that “Castro nourished the idea of this regime’s
inherent emancipatory nature, which entailed the use of violence, presenting it as a legitimate
resource to eliminate any political threats, and often exercising it as a warning performance for
Cuban society.”37 Castro’s political ideologies for Cuba were, at their core, cut from the opposite
end of the same cloth as the violent, oppressive, and corrupt regime the Cuban people had just
fought to rid themselves of. The Cuban people were no better off than when the revolution started.
By mid-January 1959, American news outlets reported that the new revolutionary
government had carried out two hundred executions. In one such article, the Baltimore Sun
reported that Castro intended to continue the executions “regardless of world opinion” and when
asked if his government would call off the executions considering harsh international criticism, he
was quoted as responding, “we have given orders to shoot every one of these murderers.” 38 Castro
was just getting started when it came to purging Cuba of anyone who opposed him.
Pedraza-Bailey uses the initiation of Castro’s nationalization of foreign owned land and
assets in October 1960 as the trigger for the first wave of refuges that took flight following the
departure of Batista’s government. 39 Cuban Law No. 851, enacted August 6, 1960, provided for
the nationalization of Cuban corporations that were under the control of American stockholders.
In his article "Cuba's Seizures of American Business," Richard C. Allison examines Castro’s
nationalization of foreign owned companies and the ramifications for U.S. stockholders and Cuban
property owners. Allison captures the mercurial nature of Cuban law under Castro when he states,
“constitutional guarantees still remaining in the law must be regarded with a certain skepticism in
view of the demonstrated willingness of the Council of Ministers to suspend or alter them to suit
particular governmental purposes.”40 To illustrate his point, Allison uses the example of the
December 1959 Amendment to Article 24 which allowed Castro’s new government to confiscate
35

Ibid.
Ana Belen Martin Sevillano, Scott Morgenstern, Jorge Perez-Lopez, and Jerome Branche,
Paths for Cuba: Reforming Communism in Comparative Perspective Account, University of Pittsburgh
Press (2018), 323.
37
Ibid, 323.
38
“House Group Acts on Cuba Executions,” The Baltimore Sun (MD), January 15, 1959.
39
Pedraza-Bailey, “Cuba’s Exiles: Portrait of a Refugee Migration,” 9.
40
Richard C. Allision, "Cuba's Seizures of American Business," American Bar Association
Journal. 47, no. 1 (1961), 48.
36
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“the properties of ‘counter-revolutionaries’.”41 Other studies concerning Castro’s nationalization
and centralization of all aspects of Cuban life, such as the examination of Cuban civil society
completed by Haroldo Dilla and Philip Oxhorn, note that the process “reduced the vitality of public
spaces and led to the consolidation of paternalistic, clientelist relations between the state and
society.”42
As Allison notes, almost immediately following Castro’s rise to power in January 1959
multiple revisions, and amendments to those revisions, started occurring. There were suddenly
laws imposing harsh penalties for acts considered ‘prejudicial’ to the Cuban economy and laws
allowing the President and Prime Mister to expropriate foreign owned Cuban properties. The
Agrarian Reform Law, enacted May 17, 1959, further allowed for the expropriation and
redistribution of any landholdings exceeding 1,000 acres and provided for the establishment of
collective farms. By June, Castro’s Regime had nationalized three cattle ranches owned by
Americans.43 The nationalization of land, livestock, and all farming equipment and machinery
continued through 1960.44 As Castro’s nationalization process proceeded, American interests in
“hotels, oil refineries, banks, as well as other businesses” started to disaffect Cuba’s wealthiest
citizens who also had significant interests in the nation’s sugar plantations and mills. 45 By the time
Castro’s regime was through with initial law revisions and amendments affecting banking, utilities,
businesses, agriculture, labor, and taxes “operations in Cuba. . .[became] impossible from an
economic point of view.”46
By 1961, Castro had closed all private universities and schools in favor of state-controlled
education. This move by Castro prompted thousands of parents, fearing the loss of their parental
rights to the State, to send an estimated 14,000 children, unaccompanied by an adult, to the United
States.47 Additionally, Castro started to repress expression of religion just days after he arrived in
Havana. Law Number 4 was enacted on January 10, 1959, “abolishing the Invocation of God in
the oath of the Judiciary.”48 Two months later, on March 8, 1959, all religious and spiritual services
for prisoners was abolished at La Cabaña Fortress and other state institutions, crosses were
prohibited from being displayed in state hospitals and sanitariums, and “free instruction offered by
priests, professors, and laymen was suspended.”49 By March 1960 the Archbishop of Santiago de
Cuba had published his first “Pastoral Letter denouncing communist infiltration and warning: ‘The
enemy is within.’”50 Castro’s viscous campaign against the Catholic Church, as well as other
missionaries and spiritual leaders, included a public announcement that the revolutionary Cuban
41

Ibid, 48.
Haroldo Dilla and Philip Oxhorn, “The Virtues and Misfortunes of Civil Society in Cuba,” Latin
American Perspectives. 29, no. 4 (2002), 11-30.
43
Thomas,” Cuban Refugee Program,” 3.
44
Ibid, 3.
45
Ibid, 3.
46
Allision, "Cuba's Seizures of American Business," 49-50.
47
Pedraza-Bailey, “Cuba’s Exiles: Portrait of a Refugee Migration,” 11.
48
The Truth About Cuba Committee, Inc., Religious Persecution in Communist Cuba:
Chronology from January 1, 1959 to September 19, 1961 (1963), 2.
49
Ibid, 2.
50
Ibid, 3.
42
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government would “not permit the stay in Cuba of counterrevolutionary foreign priests.” 51 In 1961
an estimated 2,000 priests and nuns submitted applications to leave Cuba during the first exodus.52
This number does not include those who Castro either deported or executed for alleged
counterrevolutionary activity.
The first Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) “Report on the Situation
of Human Rights in the Republic of Cuba” released in 1962 adds legitimacy to United States Press
reports and documentation by the American Cuban exile community. It takes note of reports
received that “on various occasions the Cuban militiamen have interrupted religious services and
processions, seriously injuring the faithful on some occasions. . .expelled 135 priests, including a
bishop. . .arrested several active members of a secular religious association. . .and religious radio
and television programs have been indefinitely interrupted by the Government.”53 By 1963, at least
three protestant preachers, Reverend Antonio Gonzalez of the Evangélical Church, Reverend
Pablo Rodriguez of the Church of God, and Reverend Jose Durado of Gideon Church, were known
to have been executed or extra-legally killed by the Castro regime.54
Castro’s announcement that he was a Marxist-Leninist, the corresponding shifts in policy
and focus, coupled by the application of violence and cruelty by the revolutionary Cuban
government, served to shape the demographics of each occurrence of mass migration from Cuba.
Pedraza-Bailey describes the initial group of refugees as being “bound to a political and economic
structure interpenetrated by the demands and initiative of American capital.” 55 This first wave,
sometimes referred to as the ‘historical exiles’, is demographically distinct from the three tidal
bores that followed it.56 Pedraza-Bailey describes the first wave as being mostly middle-class and
the remaining upper-class economic elites that had not decided to flee Cuba with the Batista
regime.
A few refugees from the initial wave were fortunate enough to have funds deposited in
either United States or other foreign bank accounts. As the upper and middle-class flight from
Cuba continued the revolutionary government started to recognize the negative effects of the flight.
Those seeking permission to leave started facing increasingly strict rules. It was not long before
“all real and personal property was confiscated from refugees,” and they were allowed to leave
with “only one suit, a few changes of underwear, and a maximum of five pesos.”57

51

"2,000 Religious Process Exit From Cuba," Havana Cadena Oriental, May 9, 1961, Translated
in Daily Report, Foreign Radio Broadcasts, no. FBIS-FRB-61-090, May 10, 1961.
52
Ibid.
53
Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Organización de los Estados Americanos.
“Informe Sobre la Situación de los Derechos Humanos en la República de Cuba,” OEA/Ser.L/V/II.4
(March 20, 1962), accessed September 9, 2022, http://www.cidh.org/ countryrep/Cuba62sp/indice.htm.
54
The Truth About Cuba Committee, Inc., Religious Persecution in Communist Cuba:
Chronology from January 1, 1959 to September 19, 1961, 9.
55
Pedraza-Bailey, “Cuba’s Exiles: Portrait of a Refugee Migration,” 9-10.
56
Duany, “Cuban Migration: A Postrevolutionary Exodus Ebbs and Flows,” Migration Policy
Institute.
57
John F. Thomas,” Cuban Refugee Program,” Welfare in Review. 1, no. 3, (1963), 1.
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The first upper and middle-class exodus included mainly “middle merchants and middle
management, landlords, middle-level professionals and a considerable number of skilled and
unionized workers” which included an estimated “2,000 accountants, 200 architects, 100 chemists,
300 dentists, 550 engineer, 1,800 lawyers, 500 pharmacists, 1,000 physicians, and 3,500 teachers
and college professors.”58 They were joined by “professionals and technicians of all types;
company directors, executives, managers, and stockholders; advertising, marketing, newspaper,
radio, and television executives and medium rank- personnel; persons whose incomes derived from
rents; owners of medium-sized cattle ranches and sugar plantations; insurance and finance
company men; and representatives of American companies which exported to Cuba.” 59 The flight
of these members of Cuban society marked the beginning of the depletion of Cuba’s educated
professionals and skilled workers. By mid-1961, the demographic had shifted to include more
middle and lower socioeconomic professions including “small merchants, office employees,
skilled and semiskilled factory workers, lower-grade technicians, and unskilled workers.”60
Castro may have ridded himself of opponents and dissidents, but he lost key professionals
and technicians that had been responsible for maintaining supply lines, keeping key machinery
operational, and providing key health and social service functions, such as doctors and medical
professionals. It did not take long before the dramatic drain on Cuba’s human resources prompted
Castro to formulate polices to refuse exit to two key groups, males aged fifteen to twenty-six who
were subject to compulsory military service and any “technical or skilled workers whose exit
would cause a ‘serious disturbance’ in delivering social services or in production.” 61
The first wave of refugees ended between the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 and the
Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 when Castro closed legitimate avenues for exiting Cuba.
After the Cuban Missile Crisis, exit was only achievable illegally via extremely dangerous water
crossings in rafts or small boats. Some refugees did find more creative means of smuggling
themselves out of Cuba by stowing away on cargo ships, defecting during world sporting events,
and finding ways off Cuban planes when they landed to refuel. 62
Human Rights Violations and Censorship
In early May 1961 American newspapers ran an article from the Associated Press. Castro
had taken refuge from international criticism for his regime’s brutality behind a “curtain of total
censorship on news communications and mail.” 63 Canadian Press Staff writer Jack Best wrote a
widely circulated news article in August 1961 detailing his experiences with the Castro Regime’s
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censorship. Best stated “in a sense their censorship is more drastic than in countries where there
are official censors, because stories from Cuba may be revised and distorted rather than simply
eliminated or slashed.”64 Cuban ‘censorship’ entailed outgoing news stories frequently being
altered to include propagandistic language, for example ‘priests’ became ‘fascist priests’, or altered
in a manner to make the Castro regime’s actions appear righteous and justified. 65
The world press, through information provided by refugees fleeing Cuban, pieced together
the atrocities committed by the Castro regime despite government censorship. Estimates of those
detained in Havana since Castro’s takeover in 1959 have been reported to be between 25,000 and
40,000 people, including Cubans, foreign nationals, and Americans. Unfortunately, such early
estimates of the number of political prisoners are not likely to be dependable. The conditions of
the prisons and holding areas as alleged by the press were inhumane. The press printed descriptions
of “prisoners screaming for food” and “fighting their way through a litter of filth and excrement
for a chance to use the few toilets.” 66 Stories were related to the press about guards firing shots
into the crowds and the use of police dogs to quell attempted prisoner uprisings. At Morro Castle
there was a report of “thousands of Cubans. . .herded into the dry moats” and at Matanzas
“thousands. . .were taken into an open sports stadium and detained without food or sanitation for
several days.”67 The inhumane treatment of prisoners and detainees by the Castro regime, as well
as rumors of abuses heaped upon prisoners’ families, eventually were corroborated by defecting
members of the regime and other exiles who had initially been supportive of or actively involved
in Cuba’s revolutionary government.
In 1962 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) of the Organization
of American States (OAS) released its first “Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Republic of Cuba.” Since the Commission’s establishment by the Organization of American States
(OAS) in 1959, the Commission had taken “cognizance of 391 specific communications on
specific acts of human rights violations in Cuba. . .[and] 530 communications of a general
nature.”68 By the time the first report was compiled an additional 35 specific and 19 general
communications had been received. 69 The IACHR sent twenty-five notes to the Cuban government
concerning the complaints that had been received but only received responses to eight. 70
Concerning the contents of the responses received from the Cuban government the report states:
In general, the responses received. . .have been limited to expressing its disagreement with
the interpretation given by the Commission. . .Only on one occasion did the
aforementioned Government offer to send a detailed list of measures adopted to guarantee
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the full exercise of human rights to the “great popular masses” of Cuba. However, to date
the communication offered has not been received. 71
The IACHR began holding hearings on October 5, 1961, and audiences were granted to the
President and members of the Cuban Revolutionary Council in exile, members of the Student
Revolutionary Directorate of Cuba in exile, representatives of the Cuban Economic Corporations
in exile, as well as numerous individuals.72
The 1962 report acknowledges that relevant legislative amendments examined were within
“the scope of the sovereign powers of the Cuban State,” however, its investigation led it to
conclude that “the imprecision of the new revolutionary legislation and the arbitrary way in which
it has been applied, the number of those shot to date, after the revolutionary courts were
reestablished, amounts to terrifying figures.” 73 The IACHR took note of the report of 1,789
individuals dead at the hands of the Cuban state through October 1961, including 638 officially
executed, 165 executed without trial, 132 dead in prison, 253 “dead due to the ‘law of flight’, and
the balance dead for various reasons also of political origin.” 74 The report also covered the violent
activities of “so-called Neighborhood Committees”, on the spot execution of citizens attempting
illegal exits from the country, and the gunning down of individuals attempting to reach the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs seeking diplomatic asylum. 75
Embassies in Havana corroborated reports of the denial of the right to asylum. The IACHR
reports states:
The embassies in Havana are full of asylees who unnecessarily request safe-conducts from
the Cuban government to leave the country. Moreover, it is stated that the embassies are
strongly guarded to prevent the entry of politically persecuted people and that there are
frequent shootings and demonstrations around them to intimidate the refugees and their
families.76
The report takes specific note of reports from the Ecuadorian diplomatic headquarters, the
President of Venezuela, and the reports of shooting and violence directed at asylum seekers by
Cuban militia outside both the Embassies of Ecuador and Uruguay.
Author Talek Nantes, in a collection of mostly anonymous recollections of Cuban exiles,
retells the ordeal of one middle-class family who attempted to leave Cuba during the first wave of
migration. The daughter had been attending school in the U.S. and had a fiancé in Cuba who she
described as being “ecstatic and rush[ing] to join the milicianos.”77 Her parents had become
disaffected by Castro’s communist policies and “in fear for their safety, my family decided to
71
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leave.”78 The exile’s mother had told her not to tell her fiancé of the family’s plans, however, she
did and pleaded with him to leave too. The following day she learned that milicianos had appeared
at her parents’ home and taken them away. Her father was convicted of being a
counterrevolutionary and imprisoned for ten years in La Cabaña prison. Her mother, also
convicted of being a counterrevolutionary, was sentenced to five years and then murdered in prison
in an argument over some food. Her father had an additional ten years added to his sentence after
a cellmate informed the warden that he had “spoken against Castro.” 79 Karma seems to have found
her fiancé though, a ‘snitch’ betrayed him alleged involvement in the black-market.80
Another exile’s ordeal followed the Bay of Pigs invasion. The family came home to find
their home sealed by the G-2 (secret police). The exile was a child but recalls going “with my
father because my mother thought they were less likely to abuse a man with a small child.” 81 The
exile remembers seeing other men at the G-2 office who had been beaten. The exile was released.
When they returned home, their house had been turned upside down and their belongings had been
both broken and stolen. The G-2 had detained the father for questioning over a battery testing
device he utilized in the course of his employment as a salesman with an American battery
company. The harassment did not stop with the damages to their home. Later, when the father tried
to back the car out of the driveway, he found that “milicianos had spread the blood-stained
uniforms of the Brigada 2506 in the driveway.” 82
The 1962 report of the IACHR lends credibility to such accounts when it states “in practice
and without a court order, they raid Cuban homes, especially in the early hours of the morning to
deliberately produce anxiety and unrest among their residents and neighbors. Armed with machine
guns and in gangs, the militiamen (government police officers) break down doors when they are
not allowed to enter.”83 Several cases are cited to prove the assertion, reporting that people who
protest the violation of their homes are detained, injured, and even killed.84
In 1966 the IACHR investigated allegations that on May 27 through May 28, 1966, one
hundred sixty-six political prisoners were exsanguinated of nearly all of their blood prior to their
execution. Information gathered by the IACHR included accounts of political prisoners used in
medical experiments by Cuban and Soviet military physicians and having their blood extracted
and sold for profit to the North Vietnamese Embassy in Havana. Cuban exiles forced to take part
in the execution process, as well as former prisoners, provided firsthand accounts. Newspapers
printed portions of the information under consideration by the IACHR. Forced blood extractions
“caused loss of consciousness and paralysis,” exsanguinated prisoners were “carried on litters by
guards” and placed either “lying on the ground or in makeshift cots against prison walls” to be
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executed by a firing squad. 85 The dead were loaded twenty-five at a time into military trucks to be
disposed of in a mass burial outside of Havana near Marianao. 86 After eight months of
investigation, the IACHR released a deprecating report condemning the blood extractions from
condemned prisoners prior to their execution as being carried out “with illicit and massive
intentions . . .for scandalous business purposes.”87 The IACHR also found that the Soviet’s and
the Castro regime’s cruelty extended to the families of political prisoners. As a condition of prison
visitation, family members were required to provide blood donations. These coerced donations
took place at local blood banks. The collected blood was then sold to the North Vietnamese
Embassy for profit. 88 The IACHR’s included its findings in its 1967 “Report on the Situation of
Human Rights in Cuba.”89
Since the 1966 investigation, additional executions involving exsanguination prior to
execution were documented. Two such cases in October 1960 involved Cuban Americans taken
prisoner as members of a militant exile group who attempted to land guerrilla fighters in Cuba.
Eight more exsanguination executions were documented in 1961, an additional five in 1962, eleven
in 1963, and five more in 1964.90
State violence was not strictly targeted at Americans, capitalists, or those who had formerly
served the Batista Regime, although Castro seems to have initially established its use among these
sections of the Cuban population. The early and liberal use of executions and inhumane treatment
of political prisoners as well as their families became a key motivator for those who fled Cuba.
Fear of State reprisal for alleged counterrevolutionary activities operated primarily through the
island nation’s political and economic structures for those who exited during the first exodus. But
as Castro welcomed Soviet support and firmly entrenched Eastern European style communism in
Cuba, state violence extended further towards enforcement of social, economic, and cultural
policies. The IACHR has continued to investigate allegations of human rights violations and
continued to publish the Commission’s “Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Cuba” and
the “Report on the Situation of Political Prisoners and their Families in Cuba” regularly since 1962.
Embargoes and Rationing Extremes
One thing the Batista regime had provided that the Castro regime has never provided was
a stable and thriving economy. As Castro’s activities started to hint at a move towards establishing
Eastern European style communism in Cuba, the United States began countering with economic
sanctions. By October 1960, the Eisenhower Administration had ceased sugar imports from Cuba
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and initiated a partial trade embargo that included a ban on American exports of food and medicine
to Cuba. The Kennedy Administration placed a further economic stranglehold on Cuba by
expanding the embargo and encouraging the Organization of American States (OAS) to consider
the same. The OAS embargo became reality once it became evident that Castro was silently
infiltrating other Latin American countries in attempts to export Cuban communism to the rest of
Latin America.91 In 1962 Cuba was ousted from the OAS and cut off from almost the entire western
hemisphere. Even Canada had initiated a partial embargo against Cuba. 92
Castro had burned his diplomatic bridges in the western hemisphere. The fallout from the
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis had not made him any friends among the free nations of the eastern
hemisphere either. Castro even sent an envoy to the Vatican to try to mend Cuba’s relationship
with the Catholic Church. Castro’s use of violence, harsh repression of religion and the
nationalization of Catholic Schools in Cuba, followed by the expulsion and voluntary exodus of
religious workers from Cuba, had resulted in Castro’s excommunication from the Catholic
Church.93 Relations between Castro and the Vatican would remain strained until after the fall of
the Soviet Union.
Hemispheric and individual embargoes created a severe economic crisis in Cuba. By 1963
there were severe shortages of everything from food and clothing to gasoline and automobiles. The
government instituted strict rationing policies on almost everything, including spare parts from old
motor vehicles.94 Economically these represented the most difficult years of the Cuban revolution.
The crises also proved that Castro was failing in his goal to convert Cuba from a ‘sugar
monoculture’ and successfully promote industrialization and diversity in the absence of American
capitalism.95
Talek Nantes’ collection of the ordeals endured by Cuban exiles is full of painful and
heartbreaking stories. Some of these stories involve memories of state reprisals for economic
crimes demonstrating Castro’s use of state violence to control Cubans through the economy. Prison
sentences for economic crimes exposed those convicted to the inhumane treatment and conditions
that the world press and IACHR had been documenting since Castro’s rise to power in 1959.
Stories of serving three years in a Cuban prison for the crime of ‘hoarding’ soap for resale to make
a little extra money, being tried for the crime of “cultivating pineapples for personal consumption.
. .without the permission of the Revolution,” and entire families being tried and sent to prison for
twenty years for slaughtering livestock without the permission of the state to be sold on the black
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market are only three examples.96 The Castro regime severely punished Cuban citizens for
attempting to survive the economic crises outside of the State’s parameters.
Severe food rationing and harsh punishments for circumventing the rationing instituted
between 1962 and 1963, in conjunction with compulsory military service, added to the structural
focal points that had helped trigger the first exodus. The economic crises had spawned a black
market in Cuba and penalties were harsh for being associated with it. Compulsory military service
commenced at fifteen, meaning that families attempting to exit Cuba with teenage sons subject to
compulsory military service had to make the choice to leave Cuba without their sons or to risk
staying to keep the family together. The accumulative pressures mounting inside of Cuba would
soon require a release which finally came in 1965 in the form of the Camarioca Boatlift and the
subsequent organization of the Freedom Flight exodus.97
Hurricanes, Defections, Kidnapping, and the Second Wave
By February 1963 Cubans were restless and bitter under the harsh rationing regulations on
almost all food and household items including clothing, shoes, and gasoline. 98 To make matters
worse, Mother Nature made it even more difficult on the Cuban people. On October 4, 1963,
Hurricane Flora made landfall on the southeastern side of the island. One of the worst hurricanes
on record at the time, the storm stalled over Cuba and battered the island for four days. Mother
Nature’s fury left behind one hundred inches of rain, 1,750 dead, and three hundred million dollars
in damages.99 Estimates of the damage included the loss of half of the island’s sugar, rice, coffee,
cotton, and cocoa cash crops as well as its subsistence crops. 100 Castro blatantly refused offer of
American humanitarian aid. He instead flung accusations at the United States alleging the
withholding of meteorological data about Hurricane Flora and, more ludicrously, accusations that
the United States had manipulated the storm to cause maximum damage to Cuba.101 Castro made
a plea for the United States to lift its trade embargo while at the same time refusing offers of
humanitarian aid from the United States. The request to relax the embargo was denied.
To raise money to repair and improve damaged infrastructure, Castro raised the price of
beef, poultry, beer, and cigarettes. 102 Over the next three years Cuba was hit by two more major
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hurricanes. Hurricane Cleo made landfall on August 26, 1964, leaving behind one dead and two
million dollars in damage. 103 Hurricane Alma made landfall on June 8, 1966, leaving in her wake
twelve dead and an additional two hundred million dollars in damage. 104
In June 1964, Juana Castro Ruz, a sister of Fidel and Raul Castro, who had initially been
supportive and active in her brothers’ revolutionary activities, defected to Mexico. She shocked
the world by publicly denouncing her brothers’ regime. She charged that there were 75,000
political prisoners held in Cuba being subjected to inhumane treatment. 105 She spoke of shortages
of essentials, such as food and clothing, and intimated that the sixty-three million dollars in
medicines that Castro received from the United States in exchange for Bay of Pigs prisoners did
not find its way to benefiting the Cuban people. She admitted to helping hide those persecuted by
the G-2, helping with the purchase and hiding of arms to aid counterrevolutionary groups, getting
medicine and food to political prisoners, and relaying government information to
counterrevolutionaries. Her efforts also extended to assisting people “leave the hell that is today’s
Cuba.”106 She likened her brothers’ secret police to “the worst elements of Hitler’s gestapo.” 107
Her speech further supports the anxiety and fear that her brothers’ regime was fostering:
What I do wish to speak of is the terror and panic existing in my country. Sons and
daughters ratting out parents and friends; committees of defense composed of neighbors
on each block, who observe all the people that enter and leave their houses and notify the
beasts in the G-2. Of the panic that seizes any and every home when the monsters of the
G-2 knock on their doors at any time of the day or night.108
Her own flight from Cuba had been necessitated by confrontations with her brothers
concerning her involvement with the black market, personal use of American capitalist products,
and her participation in a Catholic procession that was attacked by militia. She described a nation
of people desperate for assistance but unable to mount a challenge to a regime directly supported
by Russian soldiers. She felt that her brothers had “betrayed the revolution and sold-out Cuba to
the Soviet Union. . . [Cuba is] an enormous prison surrounded by water.” 109 Juana Castro
immediately went into hiding after her public denunciation. The Cuban exile community
responded to her sequestering herself by stating to the press that they estimated two thousand
Cuban exiles had previously been kidnapped from Mexico City by Cuban agents and returned to
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(March 1965), 177.
104
Arnold L. Sugg, "The Hurricane Season of 1966," Monthly Weather Review 95 no. 3 (March
1967), 133.
105
“Document #16: ‘Statement from Mexico City,’ Juana Castro (1964),” Brown University
Library – Center for Digital Scholarship, Modern Latin America, 8th Edition Companion Website, accessed
August 28, 2022, https://library.brown.edu/create/modernlatinamerica/chapters/
chapter-4-cuba/primary-documents-w-accompanying-discussion-questions/document-13-documen
t-of-a-cuban-dissident-year/.
106
Ibid.
107
Ibid.
108
Ibid.
109
Associated Press, “Fidel Betrayed Cuba, Fleeing Sister Says,” The News Journal
(DE). June 30, 1964.
103

Published by OpenSPACES@UNK: Scholarship, Preservation, and Creative Endeavors, 2022

95

Graduate Review, Vol. 2 [2022], Iss. 1, Art. 9

Havana.110 Even outside of Cuba, the exile community did not feel safely beyond the reach of the
Castro regime. A few reports of kidnapping attempts reached the world press.
In 1962, agents of Castro allegedly made two attempts to either kidnap or assassinate the
Cuban Revolutionary Council President, Jose Miro Cardona, in Punta del Este, Uruguay where he
was attending the Organization of American States conference on Cuba. Cuban agents were
thwarted in two attempts on Cardona, one attempt at his hotel and second at a restaurant. 111 In
September 1968 another kidnaping attempt by Cuban agents reached the world press when Cuban
diplomats attempted to kidnap twenty-four-year-old Juan Ojeda in Mexico. Ojeda, a Cuban code
expert, had defected from the Cuban mission in Jakarta, Indonesia and fled to Mexico. Mexican
federal agents intercepted a group of Cuban diplomats escorting Ojeda, who appeared to be
‘drugged,’ at gunpoint to a waiting Cuban Airlines flight. Ojeda was placed under the protective
guard of Mexican agents despite protests by the Cuban Ambassador.112
K. M. Greenhill examines the strategy behind Castro’s opening of the Cuban border that
created the second, third, and fourth tidal bores of Cuban refugees. Greenhill theorizes that Castro,
for the first time in 1965, engaged in the use of ‘coercive engineered migration.’ Castro purposely
created a mass migration event to strategically cause an immigration crisis for the United States.
Castro utilized his own citizens’ desire to leave Cuba, as well as his own need to rid himself of
those with ties to the troublesome Cuban exile community, as a means of forcing concessions from
the United States to close open Cuban migration flood gates. 113 Greenhill observes that:
“Castro quickly learned that he was effectively able to ‘manufacture negotiating leverage
for [Cuba] as a result of [his country’s] own weakness by negotiating its own options and
relying on the ‘goodwill’ of the United States, while simultaneously retaining the capacity
to threaten his counterpart’s interests.’ The most impressive part of this exercise was that
(weak actor) Castro was able to negotiate this outcome with his superpower target after
fewer than six hundred eighty-one Cubans had entered the United States.114
Holly Ackerman further observes that Castro’s opening and closing of Cuban borders to mass
migration events “whether resisting the flow or augmenting it, the objective of the Cuban state
was to maintain domestic control and to obtain political concessions from the U.S.”115
On September 29, 1965, Castro opened the port of Camarioca as a point of exit for those
who had relatives living in the United States that desired to leave Cuba. The demographics of those
who exited Cuba from October 10, 1965, through April 6, 1973, predictably shifts with the changes
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in policies and focus by Castro. The second wave consisted significantly less of the professional,
clerical, and sales professions and instead included close to forty-nine percent skilled, semi-skilled,
and unskilled blue-collar workers and the ‘petit bourgeois’ (employees, independent craftsmen,
small merchants). An estimated ten percent of the second wave was also comprised of agricultural
workers and fishermen. 116 The erratic and unorganized Camarioca boatlift quickly gave way to a
‘Memorandum of Understanding’ between the United States and Cuba. 117 The result was the
organization of the ‘Freedom Flights’ which included a hierarchical system that gave preference
to the spouses, parents, and siblings of Cuban exiles already living in the United States. 118
However, males subject to compulsory military service, “professionals, technical and skilled
workers whose exit would cause ‘a serious disturbance’ in delivering social services or in
production” were still refused legitimate exit by the Cuban government. 119
By the beginning of the Freedom Flights, those who chose to leave Cuba were forced to
forfeit all their belongings to the Cuban state. If something went awry during the exit process
denying an individual or family permission to leave, forfeited belongings were not returned. Would
be Cuban exiles were left stranded in Cuba with no job, home, or private property to return to.
Some stories collected by Talek Nantes’ relate the smuggling of personal belongings out of Cuba
that one might more reasonably suspect of drug mules. Items raged from everything from
typewriters concealed in luggage to gold jewelry and small valuables concealed in body cavities.
Explanations of why such risks were taken typically center around the hope to sell or utilize a
smuggled item to support their family economically when they reached their destination. 120
Castro completed the nationalization of property in Cuba with the confiscation of 55,636
privately owned small businesses.121 As Pedraza-Bailey notes, “With this last wave of
nationalization, all industrial trade, and service activity passed into the hands of the state. . .only
the small famer prevailed. . .the refugees. . .believed in the promises of the revolution until the
Cuban government labeled them ‘parasites’ and took over their small business holdings.”122 When
the Freedom Flights terminated in 1973 roughly 260,600 Cubans had abandoned their homes and
belongings in Cuba for the United States and other countries. 123
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After the Freedom Flights ended April 6, 1973, the flood of Cuban refugees slowed until
1980. A major trigger for the 1980 Cuban mass migration, commonly referred to as the Mariel
Boatlift, occurred in 1979 when an estimated 100,000 Cuban exiles took advantage of the Cuba
government’s invitation to visit relatives in Cuba. These visits renewed broken family ties, but
more importantly they made it increasingly difficult for economically strapped Cuban citizens to
continue to be accepting of both communist repression and extremely grim economic prospects.
The third wave, more so than the preceding waves, was driven by hope as opposed to fear and
desperation.124 But this did not hold true for all Marielitos.
Severe cyclical economic crises and general unrest began boil over in 1979. By late
October hijacking Cuban boats to the United States had become increasingly more common. These
hijackings violated the 1973 Hijacking Treaty, but the United States made little effort to prosecute
boat hijackers. This resulted in diplomatic protests from Cuba which the United States simply
ignored.125
Other violent attempts to escape Cuba in 1979 included crashing buses into the Venezuelan
Embassy, until the Embassy reinforced barriers to prevent such incidents. A year later, in 1980 a
group of six Cubans used a bus to crash through Cuban guards and onto the grounds of the Peruvian
Embassy, killing one Cuban guard. 126 The Peruvians granted the six Cubans asylum despite
demands by the Cuban government for their return. In retaliation for the Peruvians’ refusal to hand
over the bus crashers, Castro removed his guards and announced that the Peruvian Embassy was
open to anyone wanting to leave Cuba. Soon an estimated 10,000 hopeful Cubans had crowded
onto the grounds of the Peruvian Embassy.127
Castro once again utilized ‘coercive engineered migration’ and, like the second exodus, on
the surface it appeared that Castro was merely releasing pressure and ridding himself of dissidents
with ties to the Cuban exile community. However, Castro was making very pronounced but
unspoken political statement. Cuba, not the United States, was in control of immigration at the
Florida border.128 The United States was faced with a Cold War immigration policy conundrum.
If it wanted to continue making Castro and the Soviets look bad by virtue of the number of people
trying to escape from communist Cuba, then it had to accept Cuban refugees fleeing the oppressive
communist regime.
On April 20, 1980, Castro opened the port of Mariel. He invited Cuban exiles to come by
boat to pick up relatives who wanted to leave.129 Hundreds of boats arrived from the United States.
However, upon arrival, Cuban officials forced boat captains to transport unrelated persons in
addition to family. A handful of these extra refugees were forced migrants originating in Cuba’s
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prisons and mental hospitals. Members of the Cuban LGBT community also voluntarily left
Cuba.130
Homosexuality has always been criminalized by the Castro regime. Prior to 1959,
homosexuals often took jobs in the tourist sector catering to the demands of foreign guests. After
1959 communist Cuba defined homosexuality as a “deviant symptom of bourgeois excess” and a
“morally corrupt manifestation of capitalism” that would not exist under Cuban communism. 131
The result was that homosexuals were removed from their positions as educators and many other
occupations.
In 1965 Castro opened the Military Units to Aid Production (UMAP). Individuals of
working age deemed unsuitable for military service were sent to these ‘reeducation’ camps. Those
incarcerated included homosexuals, religious practitioners, musicians, artists, the unemployed, and
those who had previously sought permission to leave Cuba.132 UMAP camp inmates were put to
hard agricultural labor, usually in the sugar cane fields, and forced to live in inhumane conditions.
By April 1967, it had been estimated that 30,000 people had been sent to the camps and another
40,000 were expected to arrive. 133 The new UMAP camps, and one concentration camp named
“26 de Julio” located near the town of Esmerelda that interred several thousand Cuban citizens
accused of ‘vagrancy,’ again attracted the attention of the IACHR. Results of the investigations
were published in the Commission’s1967 report. 134
There were widespread human rights violations alleged in the UMAP camps. “Records
show that gays underwent new experimental and psychiatric treatments, including drug
therapies…Jehovah’s Witnesses especially suffered bloody beatings.” 135 LGBT Marielitos
referred to the camps as the “House of Witches” and “concentration camps for homosexuals.”136
Although the UMAP camps were only open for a brief period, they damaged the lives of thousands
of Cuban citizens. For the Cuban LGBT community, the Mariel Boatlift represented an escape
from living in constant fear.
Those who were unable to depart legally via the port of Mariel sought illegal, sometimes
violent, means of exiting the country. One such example is the Canimar River Massacre of July 6,
1980. Three armed Cubans, one a military deserter, hijacked a tourist excursion service boat. The
130
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Cuban military opened fire on the hijacked boat killing and wounding passengers. They finally
succeeded in sinking the boat by ramming it with a boat used for heavy industrial work. The
military deserter committed suicide, but the other two hijackers chose to try to save the surviving
passengers from drowning. The two surviving hijackers received thirty-year sentences. In prison,
they were subjected to psychiatric torture, psychotropic drugs, and extended isolation in a dark
cell. With Spanish intervention, both men were eventually freed and exiled to Spain. 137
The shift in the demographics of the Marielitos was even more distinct from the preceding
exoduses. First, an estimated forty percent of the refugees were black. By law, discrimination
based on sex or race was not supposed to exist in Cuba. However, as Pedraza-Bailey summarizes:
The salience of race in the revolution predisposed them to leave, for it created role strain:
both felt unequal to the new expectations. White workers perceived that the revolution
displayed favoritism towards blacks; blacks felt that it suffered from tokenism.”138
Castro’s revolution had failed to irradicate both racism and sexism at Cuba’s cultural core.
Pedraza-Bailey breaks Marielito occupations down into professionals, among whom
teachers were most represented, accountants, entertainers, urban planners, architects, and nurses
with roughly seventy-one percent being blue collar workers, including craftsmen and semi-skilled
and unskilled workers, among which construction and transportation occupations were
overrepresented.139 Marielitos were also younger than preceding waves, being primarily between
the ages of twenty and thirty-four years old.140 Pedraza-Bailey also utilizes estimates from the
Immigration and Naturalization Service to examine the makeup of the small group of forced
migrants. Close to twenty-three percent were political prisoners. About seventy percent had been
incarcerated for minor infractions or crimes only recognized in Cuba. Only about six hundred
migrants were attributed to having their origins in a mental hospital and forced migration.141
The Mariel boatlift migration ended in late September 1980. An estimated 125,000 Cuban
refugees had crossed the Florida Straits. Castro had strategically exploited a weakness between the
Carter Administration, the Miami Cuban exile community, and Miami authorities. Castro’s
motivation for opening the port of Mariel was revenge on the United States for ignoring diplomatic
protests concerning the 1979 Cuban boat hijackings. The Carter Administration’s policy was still
to receive the refugees with ‘open arms’ while Miami officials made threats to confiscate boats
returning from Cuba to prevent the arrival of more refugees. Castro’s decision to send the criminal
and mentally ill was designed to create ‘fear and outrage’ among the American public. As a result
of Castro’s manipulations, Cuban refugees were faced with growing hostility both in Cuba and the
United States.142
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The 1994 Balseros Crisis
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the hijacking of boats and the number of balseros
(rafters) began to rise once again. Another increasingly common means of escaping Cuba was
through the United States Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay. However, reaching the base was not
easy. Land routes are blocked by fields of landmines, so refugees resorted to swimming to the
base. In 1993 United States officials issued protests when soldiers at Guantánamo Bay witnessed
Cuban troops dropping grenades in the path of swimmers, strafing the water with machine guns,
and lifting the bodies of refugees out of the water with gaffs.143
The year 1993 also saw the defection of Fidel Castro’s estranged, illegitimate daughter,
Alina Fernandez Revuelta. When asked what bothered her most about Cuba she stated, “It’s very
tiring being on a permanent war footing for so many years. . .Cuba is always in a state of war. .
.We have never lived in peace.”144 Alina was critical of her father. “When people tell me he [is] a
dictator, I tell them that’s not the right word. . .Fidel is a tyrant. . . an absolute ruler unrestricted
by law, who usurps people’s rights.”145After her successful defection Alina turned her attention
towards extricating her daughter from Cuba.
One of the sparks that fanned the flame of the Balsero Crisis occurred on July 13, 1994.
Seventy-two Cubans stole an old tugboat belonging to the Maritime Services Enterprise of the
Ministry of Transportation with the intention of reaching the United States. Eyewitness reports
state that two Maritime Service Enterprise boats immediately gave chase. Two more Maritime
Service Enterprise boats joined the chase, each was equipped with tanks and water hoses. About
seven miles off the coast of Cuba, the four Maritime Service Enterprise boats commenced an attack
against the ‘13 de Marzo’. One boat blocked the stolen tugboat from the front and a second attacked
from the rear, splitting the stern. The two newly arrived boats positioned themselves on either side
of the pilfered tug and “sprayed everyone on deck with pressurized water, using their hoses”
driving passengers below to the tug’s engine room.146 The tug finally sank leaving forty-one of the
passengers dead. The crews of the four Maritime Services Enterprise boats did not aid those on
the sinking ‘13 de Marzo.’147 The thirty-one survivors of the ‘13 de Marzo’ were not rescued until
Cuban Coast Guard cutters arrived. Survivors were transported to a detention center where the
women and children were finally released and the men held. 148 A report was made to the IACHR
on July 19, 1994, and an investigation into the incident was opened. 149
With the Cold War was ending, the United States was intent on not allowing a repeat of
the Mariel exodus. On August 5, 1994, protest riots erupted at the Havana seawall as the Cuban
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government began implementing measures to prevent boat thefts and hijackings. By August 8,
1994, civil unrest, prompted by the sinking of the ‘13 de Marzo’, led Fidel Castro to pull back his
Frontier Guard to allow those who wished to leave Cuba by sea to leave. As Castro opened the
Cuban migration flood gates once again, the Clinton administration responded first by ordering all
ports closed to traffic going south towards Cuba, effectively preventing Cuban Americans from
sending boats to pick up refugees as had happened in both the Mariel and Camarioca boatlifts.
Then on August 19, 1994, President Bill Clinton made the announcement that Cuban rafters were
to be refused entrance to the United States and rafters intercepted by the United States Coast Guard
were to be transported and detained at the naval base at Guantánamo Bay. The Clinton
Administration had also halted charter flights from the United States to Cuba and terminated
remittances by Cuban Americans to their relatives still living in Cuba. 150
Despite changes in United States Cuban immigration policies, by August 25, 1994, the
United States Coast Guard estimated that it had intercepted 13,084 Cuban rafters.151 Holly
Ackerman examines the Balsero (rafter) phenomenon from 1959 through the 1994 crisis. In her
dissertation she observes that:
The image of the rafters was as individual objects of rescue – not as subjects controlling
their own destiny. The dangers of rafting were well known and created an image of despair.
This underscored the image of the regime as omnipotent. To escape one had to be prepared
to die.152
Ackerman provides several estimates of the number of Balseros who did not survive crossing the
Florida Straits from Cuba, but it is generally agreed that, based on the data available, Balsero
refugees stood a 1:4 chance of survival. 153 She also quotes Fidel Castro’s estimate that, over a four
year period, out of 51,076 Balseros only 13,275 survived.154 She notes that the general distrust of
neighbors and friends, due to the pervasive snitch environment that is strongly encouraged by the
Cuban government, prevents Cuban citizens from organizing coordinated, nonviolent, protest
movements. Riots, such as erupted at the Havana seawall after the sinking of the ‘13 de Marzo,’
are “quickly controlled and.. . subsequently labeled as violent, anti-social elements by the
government.”155
The 1994 Balsero mass migration differed in one significant way from the preceding mass
migration events from Cuba. Those who attempted to exit Cuba in 1994 on makeshift rafts were
overwhelmingly Cubans who had been born after Castro came to power in 1959. Ackerman notes
that their motivations for leaving Cuba did not differ that much from earlier Balsero refugees, but
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instead of fleeing a transition from freedom to communism, the younger generation was fleeing a
society they no longer wished to be stifled by. 156
Negotiations would not commence between the United States and Castro until September
1, 1994. An agreement was quickly reached on September 9 and Castro closed the Cuban borders
once more on September 13, 1994. With the exception of unaccompanied minors, acutely or
chronically ill, and the elderly, the Balseros detained at Guantánamo Bay would not be allowed to
enter the United States until May 2, 1995.157 Today it is more common for Cubans to flee to Latin
American countries and then make their way north to the Mexican-United States boarder in their
attempts to migrate to the United States. Cubans make up a small percentage of those waiting in
limbo at the border in 2021.158
Facing the Future
In 2006, prior to Fidel Castro’s death, and again in 2016, after his death, Forbes magazine
ran articles estimating the dictator’s net financial worth. After accounting for what they believed
to be privately held real estate and business interests, Forbes estimated that Fidel Castro’s
individual net financial worth in 2006 was close to nine hundred million dollars. 159 Despite the
dictator’s vehement denial of Forbes’ estimate, the articles generated widespread criticism of
dictator. A former security guard alleged that the dictator owned significant interest in private
property including up to twenty mansions, a private island, yacht, and a cheese factory. 160 Fidel
Castro was criticized for living a life of luxury while the Cuban people starved. On the other hand,
a select few came to his defense criticizing Forbes’ methodology in arriving at their estimate. They
pointed out that it was next to impossible to determine if Fidel personally owned the property or if
it was a state owned ‘perk’ of being Cuba’s leader. 161 Either way, there appears to be evidence that
the Castros had exclusive access to daily luxuries the financially strapped Cuban people did not.
In February 2021, a song titled Patria y Vida (Fatherland and Life) was released. A
collaboration between four Cuban exiles and two Cubans, the title is a play on Fidel Castro’s
slogan ‘patria o muerte’ (fatherland or death). It is representative of a frustrated younger
generation of Cubans who live in a world where youth are arrested for riding skateboards and
musicians, artists, and writers are still censored and inhumanely punished and imprisoned for
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creative transgressions against the Cuban government.162 The song, a harsh criticism of the Cuban
government, became an anthem at public protests. A Harvard Political Review article written by
Ana Brito in November 2021 observes that “Cubans no longer fear risking their lives in the streets
because their alternatives are not much better. . .frequent power outages, political oppression. .
.dwindling food supplies [have] mounted to a deteriorating quality of life. . .Cubans no longer want
to flee their motherland. . .they want to see substantive and positive change at home.” 163 Alina
Fernandez Revuelta previously summed the situation up in 1992 when she stated, “I don’t think
people can take this level of stress for much longer.” 164
Since 1959 Cuban exiles have become new generations of Cuban Americans and they have
proven themselves capable of exercising political influence in the United States at the ballot box.
So long as Cuban Americans want economic pressure kept on the Castro regime, politicians are
unlikely to make any move towards lifting the long-standing embargo and the embargo remains in
place as of this writing. What started out as an expression of foreign policy in the United States
has since mutated into an expression of domestic politics. 165
In recent years, Cuban exiles have started the work of officially accounting for Cubans who
have been executed, died in prison, killed extra-legally, or simply disappeared under the Castro
regime. Such work has started to expose a history of state violence and human rights violations
more fully, including such acts perpetrated by the Batista regime in the years prior to the Cuban
Revolution. Documentation of executions and people who died while in custody attest to the
brutality the regime is still capable of today, years after Fidel Castro’s death. The difficulty of
locating government documentation, including known failures to create and file death certificates,
also attests to the efforts to conceal ongoing human rights violations.
The Cuban State’s use of violence to enforce policies and ideologies has been a constant
since Fidel Castro’s rise to power in January 1959. As the regime matured it became increasingly
adept at exercising control using violence expressed both directly, though government action, and
Anamaria Sayre, “Explaining ‘Patria Y Vida,’ The Song That’s Defined The Uprising
in Cuba.” npr music. July 20, 2021; and Vanesa Wilkey-Escobar, dir. Amigo Skate, Cuba. Hollywood, CA:
Indican Pictures, 2020, DVD, Digital Copy.
163
Ana Brito, “’Patria y Vida:’ The Sound of Cuban Protests,” Harvard Political Review
(harvardpolitics.com), November 23, 2021.
164
“Castro’s daughter: ‘Cuban socialism is a dead-end street’,” The Miami Herald (FL), July 27,
1992.
165
Mendoza, Plinio Apuleyo, Carlos Alberto Montaner and Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Guide to the
Perfect Latin American Idiot, Lanham, MD: Madison Books (2001), 101.
162

https://openspaces.unk.edu/grad-review/vol2/iss1/9

104

Marshall: Cuban State Violence and Diaspora

indirectly, through encouraging a ‘snitch’ system among the general population. Fear of state
reprisal has served as a commonality between economic, political, social, and cultural migration
pushes in Cuba since 1959. There is evidence that the use of violence by the Cuban government
to enforce ideology, policy, and law directly affects the decisions of Cuban citizens to risk their
lives to leave their homeland. It is an area in Cuban studies that has received limited attention and
would benefit from more detailed study.
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